

Capacity Constraints in Cognitive Function

Outline

- **Multitasking and Control**
- **Miller's Law**

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Cognitive Control

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and most embarrassing one:

the *radical* constraint on its engagement

There are even *laws* prohibiting allocation of control
to more than one task at a time:

Talking on a cell phone and driving

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What is its *cause*, and *why* is it so *restrictive*?

Capacity Constraints

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 - metabolic (energetically costly) or
 - structural (limited number of “slots”)

Capacity Constraints


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
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

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

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- **Symbolic models (production system architectures)**

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
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- ◆ Scheduling constraints to avoid cross-talk imposed by interacting processes
 - ◆ Assume pre-specified processing architecture
 - ◆ Beg the question: ***why that architecture?***

Shared Representation vs. Multitasking

- Basic idea:


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
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
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Shared Representation vs. Multitasking

- Basic idea:

- Pathway overlap (shared representations) introduces potential for cross-talk
- The purpose of control is to manage this
- Can solve the problem without control... but that carries its own costs:



Shared Representation vs. Multitasking

- **Classic illustration:**


(Shaffer et al., 1975)

- *echoing* a speech stream while *copy-typing* (easy)


vs.

- *dictation* while *reading aloud* (hard)

Shared Representation vs. Multitasking



Shared Representation vs. Multitasking



Crossings



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Control reflects *bound on rational processing*

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Navon & Gopher (1979); Allport (1982); Meyer & Kieras, (1997)
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
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 - Modest amounts of overlap (sharing) *dramatically* limits multitasking
 - Constraints on multitasking reflect this tradeoff


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- **Formal treatment:**
 - **Numerical analysis** (simulations in a variety of network architectures)
 - **Mathematical analysis** (graph theoretic analyses)

Pathway Overlap (Shared Representation)



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Why Shared Representations?

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- **Learning benefits by shared representations**

Why Shared Representations?

- **But this costs us in the ability to multitask**
(i.e., do two control-demanding tasks at once)

Why Shared Representations?

- **To see this, let's do a little demonstration...**

Color Naming + Location Pointing

Name the color of the stimulus and
at the same time point to where it is...

BLUE

YELLOW

Word Mapping

Point left if the written word is

← RED

Point right if the written word is

GREEN →

GREEN

RED

Color Naming + Word Mapping

Name the color of the following stimulus
and, *at the same time*:

Point left if the written word is

← RED



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
GREEN

RED

Learning and Multitasking




Color Naming




Color Naming + Location Pointing

Multitasking *is* possible




Word Mapping

New task easily learned




Color Naming + Word Mapping

...but can't multitask




Color Naming + Word Mapping

Could multitask...




Color Naming + Word Mapping


or even...




Network Representation of Multiple Tasks




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

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


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

Single Task Training





Single Task Training



Single + Multitask Training



Single + Multitask Training



Example

JANUARY, 1923

SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN

17

Doing Two Things at Once

Multiple Consciousness, or Reflex Action of Unaccustomed Range?

By Dr. Alfred Gradenwitz

Thea Alba



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
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
Empirical Implications

**Multipurpose
but serial**




Learning

**Multitasking
and parallel**




Empirical Study

Shared Representation
(can't multitask with color naming)




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



Predicted results




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


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

Empirical Study

Shared Representation
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Separated Representation
(can multitask with color naming)



Predicted results



Summary

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- **Modest amounts of cross-talk produce a radical constraint on parallelism:**
 - **Need to go “serial” with even modest pathway overlap**
 - ⇒ constraints on multitasking capacity**

Summary

- Modest amounts of cross-talk produce a radical constraint on parallelism:
 - Need to go “serial” with even modest pathway overlap
⇒ constraints on multitasking capacity
- Control architecture is adapted to this constraint:
 - reflects optimization of tradeoff between shared of representations and processing efficiency

Learning vs. Performance

Learning vs. Performance

- Fundamental tradeoff:

SHARED representations
generalization & flexibility:
learning efficiency

vs.

SEPARATED representations
multitasking:
performance efficiency

Learning vs. Performance

- Fundamental tradeoff:

BIAS


SHARED representations

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BIAS


- Explains:

- Capacity constraints in cognitive control:
 - *purpose of cognitive control rather than a limitation*

Learning vs. Performance

- **Fundamental tradeoff:**

SHARED representations
generalization & flexibility: vs.
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- **Explains:**

- Capacity constraints in cognitive control:
 - *purpose of cognitive control rather than a limitation*
- Continuum of serial vs. parallel processing in distributed systems

Learning vs. Performance

- **Fundamental tradeoff:**

AUTOMATIZATION



SEPARATED representations

multitasking:

performance efficiency

- **Explains:**

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- Fundamental tradeoff:

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multitasking:
performance efficiency

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- **Defines an intertemporal choice between “getting by” and “getting trained”**
 - *how does the system decide this?*
 - *how can this be formalized?*

Fundamental Tension

- *Interactive* Parallelism

- *Independent* Parallelism

Fundamental Tension

- *Interactive* Parallelism

- many small *interacting* computations in the service of some *single* coherent higher level process

- *Independent* Parallelism

Fundamental Tension

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- at the core of *PDP* (and now deep learning)

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Fundamental Tension

- *Interactive* Parallelism

- relies on *shared representations* (*learning efficiency*)

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- requires “protection” from interference \Rightarrow *control-dependent*

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- many *separate* unrelated computations

Fundamental Tension

- *Interactive* Parallelism

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- *Independent* Parallelism

- at the core of traditional “*embarrassing*” *parallelism* (e.g., MPI)

Fundamental Tension

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- *Independent* Parallelism

- relies on *separated representations*

Fundamental Tension

- *Interactive* Parallelism

- requires “protection” from interference \Rightarrow *control-dependent*

- *Independent* Parallelism

- allows “multitasking” \Rightarrow *automaticity* (processing efficiency)

Outline

- Multitasking and Control



- Miller's Law

Classics in the History of Psychology

VOL. 63, No. 2



MARCH, 1956

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW

THE MAGICAL NUMBER SEVEN, PLUS OR MINUS TWO:
SOME LIMITS ON OUR CAPACITY FOR
PROCESSING INFORMATION¹

GEORGE A. MILLER


Harvard University

My problem is that I have been persecuted by an integer. For seven years this number has followed me around, has intruded in my most private data, and has assaulted me from the pages of our most public journals. This number assumes a variety of disguises, being sometimes a little larger and sometimes a little smaller than usual, but never changing so much as to be unrecognizable. The persistence with which this number plagues me is far more than a random accident. There is, to quote a famous senator, a design behind it, some pattern governing its appearances. Either there really is something unusual about the number or else I am suffering from delusions of persecution...




3 Tasks


- **Visual Working Memory Task**



- **Absolute Perceptual Judgement**




- **Numerosity Estimation (“subtilizing”)**




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
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



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



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

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



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



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

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7 +/- 2
(~2.5 bits)

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
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... For the present I propose to withhold judgment. Perhaps there is something deep and profound behind all these sevens, something just calling out for us to discover it. But I suspect that it is only a pernicious, Pythagorean coincidence.

And the list goes on...

- **Classic verbal short-term memory task**
(Sternberg, 1966)
- **Classic working memory tasks**
(Baddeley, 1990; Cowan, 1999; Luck & Vogel, 1997)
- **Attention / visual search tasks**
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Treisman & Gelade, 1980)
- **Control-dependent processing**
(Posner & Snyder, 1975; Pashler, 1994)



And the list goes on...



- All exhibit $\leq 2^{1/2}$ bit capacity limit

And the list goes on...




- But for the same reason?

An Information Theoretic Perspective

Empirical State

Stimulus “Noumenal”
features code




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Empirical State

Internal Representation

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“Phenomenal” code




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
“Phenomenal” code
Conjunctive



An Information Theoretic Perspective


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Conjunctive Compositional

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0

Transmission →

Capacity:

← Mutual Information →

$$H(X) + H(Y) - H(X, Y)$$

19
82
2
41
23
57
6
61
8
4
96
11
12
45
14
2

0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0

Semanticity of Codes

Conjunctive Code

Semantic + Compositional Code



	1	.3	.1	0	0	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	.3	1	.3	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	.1	.3	1	.3	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	.1	.3	1	.3	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	.1	.3	1	.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	.1	0	0	.1	.3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	.1	0	.2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	.1	1	.8	.4	.3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.8	1	.1	.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	.2	.4	.1	1	.9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.3	.1	.9	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.4	.6	0	1	.8	.6	.4	.2			
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.4	0	.8	1	.8	.6	.4			
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.6	.8	1	.8	.6			
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.4	.6	.8	1	.8			
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	.2	.4	.6	.8	1			

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
82
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Information Bottleneck

Tishby, Naftali, Pereira & William Bialek (2000)


Zaslavskya, Kemp, Regier & Tishby (2018)



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
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identify probed item (based on one of its features)
indexes processing capacity (as a function of # items = set size)

Miller's Law

Frankland, Webb, Lewis & Cohen (2025)


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
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
Ubiquitous Effect



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
Inference

(Frankland et al., 2024)





Affordance



(Musslick et al., 2023)



Conjunctive vs. Conjunctive



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
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- Case study: **“Miller's tasks”**

Mechanistic Process Model



Steven Frankland
Dartmouth University




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Steven Frankland
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- **Encoding**

- *semantic, compositional* codes (grid cells)
- informed by available *neural / psychophysical data*:



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
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
- rapid *Hebbian associative learning* in Hopfield network

- **Processing**


- embed items
- encode in associative memory
- clamp probe
- settle to convergence (accuracy \approx cross-entropy; cycles \approx reaction time)
- evaluate as a function of set size

Miller's Tasks



- Visual Working Memory Task





Data



- Absolute Perceptual Judgement




- Numerosity Estimation (“subtilizing”)




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
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

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


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involve **novel/arbitrary** stimuli

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- **Performance: Automaticity and Control** (*Musslick et al, 2024*)
 - Control-dependent, serial processing (*shared, compositional reps*)
 - Automatic, parallel multitasking (*separated conjunctive reps*)

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 - ⇒ should *impose constraint on capacity* in same tasks as humans...

and Artificial Minds



Declan Campbell
Princeton Neuroscience

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Response: There are 6 boats in the image

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


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


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Representational Capacity * Processing Capacity $\propto k$