


Optimization and Control

Performance Monitoring

Expected Value of Control


Limitation



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Homunculus




Challenges

- How are control representations maintained w/in PFC?

- How are control representations updated?

- How are adjustments made in the degree of control?

- How do representations develop, and what do they look like?





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
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
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DDM as example:

- Starting point: *expectations* (priors)
- Drift rate: signal strength / *attention*
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
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
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 - we've considered reward, but what about *conflict*?

Less Need for Control...




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


Stimulus: **RED**


More Need for Control




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More Need for Control



Conflict Monitoring and Modulation of Control



Evidence for Performance Monitoring and Dynamic Adjustments in Control

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- **Subjects are slower and more accurate after errors**

(Rabbitt, 1966; Laming, 1968)

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
High Conflict




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
Augment Control



Augment Control



Lowers Conflict




Conflict Monitoring and ACC

(Botvinick et al., 2001)

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- **Stroop task**
Stroop model (Cohen et al. 1990)
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
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
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
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
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
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- **Stem completion (and verbal fluency)**

Interactive Activation Model (McClelland and Rumelhart, 1981)


fMRI: ACC activity (Thompson-Schill et al., 1998)




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

Forced Choice RT Task
Sequential adjustment effects
(Laming., 1968)




Eriksen Task
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
Stroop Task
Frequency effects
(Tzelgov, 1992)



Dynamics of Conflict: Error trial



Dynamics of Conflict: Post-processing and Conflict




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
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
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 - Larger ERN for **congruent** than incongruent stimuli on **error trials**
(Scheffers & Coles, 2000)



Control as Optimization of Performance



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
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
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



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Expected Value of Control Theory

- Assumptions:

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
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

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Control is “Costly”

Botvinick et al. (2009)



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
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
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 - ♦ **“top-down” biasing** of cortical pathways require to perform task
(e.g., “**attentional selection**”, goal maintenance, motor control)
 - ♦ **systemwide changes in parameters** (*neuromodulation*)
 - changes in learning rate, gating of new control signals into regulatory system
 - noise/gain modulation, explore/exploit tradeoff
 - threshold modulation

Heart of EVC: Specification




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


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


Toward a Formal Account



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


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
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
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

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
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
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
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- Of the candidate set of control signals (\approx currently executable tasks), one(s) with **highest EVC** (that fall within budget) are **selected for allocation**



Neural Architecture of EVC



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- **“like you’re headed towards a storm that’s on the other side, maybe a couple of miles away, and you’ve got to get across the hill and all of a sudden you’re sitting there going how am I going to get over that... you have to keep going forward”**



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
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


Longterm Adaptation



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 - Cost: *serialization* of processing




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
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
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
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
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- This too can be approached *normatively*:



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
- > *intertemporal choice*, when to...

- ◆ reap *immediate rewards* at cost of serial processing

- ◆ invest in *longer term reward* of more efficient processing (*multitasking*) at cost of time and effort required for automatization

- This too can be approached *normatively*:


- > *rational self-reconfiguration....*



Rational Self-Reconfiguration

- **Formal analysis of learning speed vs. processing efficiency**
(Musslick, Saxe et al., 2017)


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
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- **Bayesian optimal process model**
(Sagiv, Musslick & Cohen, 2018)

$$\mathbb{E}_B[R|t] = \sum_{i=1}^{\min\{N,K\}} \mathbb{P}(\alpha = i) \sum_{j=0}^{i-1} \mathbb{P}_B(\text{success on task } j)(1 - jC)$$


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
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

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
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- **Deep learning applications**
(Ravi, Musslick & Cohen, under review)




Longterm Adaptation



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- Cost: *serialization* of processing
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
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
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
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
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
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
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